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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
Comment on Recent Decisions
APPEALS-JuRISDICTION-REvIEW or ORDERs Or PUBLIC SERvicE COMmIS-
sION.-Since the establishment, in 1913,1 of the Public Service Commission
about one hundred orders or decisions of the Commission have reached the
Missouri Supreme Court for review as to their "lawfulness or reasonable-
ness" under the statutory provisions granting the privilege of such review,
on the record made before the Commission, first by a circuit court and, on
appeal, by the Supreme Court.2 The authority of the Supreme Court to re-
view the orders of the -Commission apparently was never seriously ques-
tioned, except in a few cases involving the extent or scope of the review,
until State ex rel. Gehr 'v. Public Service Commission.4 In that case two
certificates of convenience and necessity, issued to different highway trans-
port companies, were consolidated upon the purchase by one company of
the business and assets of the other. Proper application being made, the
Public Service Commission authorized the publication of rates to the points
to be served under the consolidated certificate. The Cole County Circuit
Court affirmed this action. On the appeal to the Supreme Court the record
challenge the jurisdiction of that Court, on the ground of the provisions
in the State Constitution defining the appellate jurisdiction of the Court.5
Without reference to any of its hundred-odd decisions reviewing orders of
1 Public Service Commission Act, Laws of 1913, pp. 556-651; now found
in its present form in R. S. Mo. 1929, sec. 5121-5281, Laws of 1931, pp. 304-
316; Laws of 1933, pp. 359-360; Laws of 1935, pp. 321-326.
2 R. S. Mo. 1929, sec. 5234, 5237. Application for a writ of review may be
made either to the circuit court in the county where the hearing was held
or to the circuit court in the county where the Commission has its principal
office. In practice most cases are heard in the circuit court of Cole County,
that is, at Jefferson City.
3 The Court's conception of its function in reviewing orders of the Com-
mission, or its position as to the scope of judicial review provided for by
the statute has not been static, but rather has undergone a gradual develop-
ment as the Commission has developed its functioning. The abandonment
of the position that the Court should weigh the evidence and make its own
findings of fact on the review, along with a statement of the court's present
attitude may be found in State ex rel. and to Use of Chicago Great West-
ern Ry. Co. v. P. S. C. (1932) 330 Mo. 729, 51 S. W. (2d) 73.
4 (1935) 90 S. W. (2d) 390; three concurrent cases receiving the same
treatment were: State ex rel. Pitcairn et al. v. P. S. C. (1935) 90 S. W.
(2d) 392; State ex rel. Gehrs v. P. S. C. (1936) 90 S. W. (2d) 394; State
ex rel. Pitcairn et al. v. P. S. C. (1935) 90 S. W. (2d) 395.
5The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction in all cases where the
amount in dispute, exclusive of costs, exceeds the sum of seven thousand
five hundred dollars; in cases involving the construction of the Constitution
of the United States or of the State; in cases where the validity of a treaty
or statute or authority exercised under the United States is drawn in ques-
tion; in cases involving the construction of the revenue laws of the State,
or the title to any office under the State; in cases involving title to real
estate; in cases where a county or other political subdivision of the State
or any State officer is a party; and in all cases of felony. See Mo. Const.,
Art. 6, Sec. 12 and Sec. 5 of the 1884 Amendment to Art. 6; also sec. 1914
of R. S. Mo. 1929.
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the Commission, the Court held that it had no jurisdiction to review the
order; that the statute authorizing such review violated the constitutional
provision limiting the appellate jurisdiction, and that the cause must be
transferred to the appropriate Court of Appeals. There being no constitu-
tional issue going to the merits of the case, and there being no "amount in
dispute" involved, the contention for upholding jurisdiction was that a
state officer was a party. Citing and following its prior decisions as to the
Workmen's Compensation Commission and the Highway Commission, 6 the
Court held that even though the members of the Commission are State
officers the Commission is a separate and distinct entity existing apart from
its individual members and is not a state. officer within the provision in the
constitution conferring jurisdiction where a state officer is a party.
While ordinarily it would be true that the absence of appellate jurisdic-
tion in the Supreme Court would necessarily make proper a removal to a
Court of Appeals, the action in this case would appear doubtful since the
statute reads in part "no court of this state, except the circuit courts to the
extent herein specified and the Supreme Court on appeal, shall have juris-
diction to review, reverse, correct or annul an order or decision of the Com-
mission .... -"7 This would seem specifically to exclude the Courts. of Appeals
from exerciseing any jurisdiction over the orders of the Commission. Logi-
cally, the combination of the constitutional and statutory provisions would
seem to preclude any appellate review in those cases where the jurisdic-
tional requirements of the constitution did not inhere in a cause.
The decision does not, of course, invalidate the statutory appeal to the
Supreme Court in all cases, but only in those not within the constitutional
classification. The decision seems to defeat the statutory scheme intended
by the Legislature. It must be recognized that it is generally impossible
to determine the "amount involved" in eases like the instant one.
R. S. L. '36.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-BANKRUPTCY-MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY ACT.-
The respondent water improvement district in a farming area of Texas, tax
ridden and insolvent, presented a plan of final settlement on $800,000 in
improvement bonds proposing a payment of 49.8 cents on the dollar under
sections 78, 79 and 80 of the Bankruptcy Act, which were added by an
amendment of 1934.1 The amendment provides for the readjustment of the
indebtedness of state subdivisions which are in the financial predicament of
the respondent and authorizes a federal court to require objecting bond-
holders to accept offers to scale down or repudiate indebtedness without the
surrender of any property by the subdivisions. Held, the amendment is an
unconstitutional exercise of congressional power amounting to an impair-
ment of state sovereignty. The majority of the court was of the opinion
6 State ex rel. Goldman v. Missouri Workmen's Compensation Commis-
sion et al. (1930) 325 Mo. 153, 27 S. W. (2d) 1026; State Highway Com-
mission v. Day (1931) 327 Mo. 122, 35 S. W. (2d) 37.
'R. S. Mo. 1929, sec. 5234.
1 (May 24, 1934) 48 Stat. 798; 11 U. S. C. A. sec. 301, et seq.
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